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PROPORTIONALITY SKEPTICISM IN A RED STATE 
Lauren Sudeall Lucas∗ 
As someone who lives in a red state and has practiced capital de-
fense in Georgia and Alabama, my view for some time has been that 
the death penalty is not going anywhere any time soon.  And while the 
dominant message from legal experts and commentators in recent 
years has been that the death penalty is on the decline,1 the results of 
this past election might suggest otherwise.  The three referenda regard-
ing capital punishment on the 2016 ballot — in California, Nebraska, 
and Oklahoma — were all resolved in favor of the death penalty.2  
These votes could be taken to signal a resurgence of public support 
for — or at the very least, a reluctance to completely abandon — the 
most severe punishment available under the law. 
Indeed, for those representing capital defendants in Georgia, last 
year only confirmed the death penalty’s brutal persistence.  While the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2016: YEAR END 
REPORT 2 (2016), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJA6 
-NFTB] (noting that the number of new death sentences and executions decreased significantly 
and that public support for the death penalty was at a four-decade low); Richard C. Dieter,  
The Future of the Death Penalty in the United States, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 921, 921 (2015) (sug-
gesting that the death penalty in the United States “may be approaching its final chapter”); Carol 
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on (Another) 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 212 
(2012) (“Today, . . . the potential for abolition looks very different, and the question seems to be 
more one of when and how — rather than whether — the American death penalty will expire.”); 
Scott Bland, Is the Death Penalty Dying?, NAT’L J. (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www 
.nationaljournal.com/s/62088 [https://perma.cc/L449-RFZA] (discussing the decrease in public 
support for the death penalty); Erik Eckhold, In Death Penalty’s Steady Decline, Some Experts 
See a Societal Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/us/in-death 
-penaltys-steady-decline-some-experts-see-a-societal-shift.html [https://perma.cc/74YM-S9S3] (de-
tailing the decline and predictions of a societal shift regarding capital punishment); Ashby Jones, 
Death-Penalty Use Continues to Decline in U.S., WALL STREET J. (Dec. 16, 2015, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/death-penalty-use-continues-to-decline-in-u-s-1450242063 [https:// 
perma.cc/E83V-NZQW]; David G. Savage, Capital Punishment in the U.S. Continues Its Decline, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-death-penalty-2014 
1218-story.html [https://perma.cc/E86Y-L73W] (reporting that “[t]he death penalty continued its 
slow and steady two-decade decline” in 2014, with “fewer convicted murderers . . . sentenced to 
die and most executions . . . limited to just three states”). 
 2 Aliyah Frumin, Election 2016: Nebraska, Oklahoma Vote in Favor of Death Penalty, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/2016-election-day/election 
-2016-nebraska-oklahoma-vote-favor-death-penalty-n681301 [https://perma.cc/XHX5-9LNY] (re-
porting that in Nebraska, 61.2% voted to repeal an earlier decision to abolish the death penalty; 
in Oklahoma, 66.4% voted to constitutionally protect capital punishment; and in California, 54% 
of voters rejected a measure to repeal the death penalty while 51% voted to speed up the time 
between convictions and executions). 
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imposition of new death sentences in Georgia has declined,3 the num-
ber of executions reached an all-time high in 2016; in fact, Georgia led 
the nation in total number of executions, with nine (Texas was second, 
with seven).4  Thus, while prosecutors and jurors have exhibited an in-
creasing reluctance to seek and impose death, voters and legislators 
throughout the country have chosen to leave their capital punishment 
schemes intact.  The machinery of death continues to grind away at a 
brisk pace.5 
How can we reconcile these seemingly contradictory phenomena, 
and what effect does or should the obstinacy of the death penalty in 
certain states, like Georgia, have on its constitutionality?  Taken to-
gether, they might suggest that the path to abolition is not as clear or 
as sure as many commentators think.6  They may also complicate the 
applicability of proportionality doctrine, which, in exploring whether 
death is an appropriate sentence for certain offenses or offenders, relies 
on an assessment of society’s contemporary values with respect to the 
question at hand.  In this Commentary, I suggest that difficulties in ac-
curately assessing public sentiment with respect to the death penalty’s 
general appropriateness, weaknesses in the empirical case for a nation-
al consensus regarding abolition, and the Court’s institutional limita-
tions may all prompt justifiable skepticism of judicial abolition 
grounded in proportionality analysis. 
In Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker provide an incredibly thorough and 
insightful overview of the American death penalty and its legal history.  
Toward the end of the book, they suggest that the death penalty in the 
United States will come to an end through judicial abolition and that 
the most promising vehicle for that holding is proportionality analysis.7  
At the most general level, proportionality inquires whether the penalty 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 The Dwindling Pipeline on Death Row, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Dec. 16, 2015),  
h t t p : / / w w w . d a i l y r e p o r t o n l i n e . c o m / i d = 1 2 0 2 7 4 4 4 9 2 1 8 7 / T h e - D w i n d l i n g - P i p e l i n e - o n - D e a t h - R o w 
-CHART [https://perma.cc/Y4WD-XXNQ]. 
 4 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 1, at 2. 
 5 Bill Rankin, Death Sentences Now a Rarity in Georgia, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 2, 2017), 
http://www.myajc.com/news/local/death-sentences-now-rarity-georgia/WdQLa49GwzpRLG9XrBi 
MIM/ [https://perma.cc/G68S-WMK8]. 
 6 See Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining 
Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929–31 (2006) (recommending 
caution in predicting the chances of abolition from a decrease in new death sentences, opinion 
polls, and the action of some state legislatures); id. at 1956 (exploring the possibility that certain 
factors “have gradually trimmed away those cases where the death penalty was most vulnerable 
and left us with a core of cases that may stubbornly resist further trimming”). 
 7 CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH 282 (2016) [hereinafter 
COURTING DEATH] (“The Court’s long and expansive development of its Eighth Amendment 
proportionality doctrine provides a detailed blueprint for a potential categorical constitutional 
challenge to the death penalty.”). 
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of death is an excessive punishment for the crime or whether the de-
fendant possesses the requisite level of culpability to justify the imposi-
tion of a death sentence.8  In determining which punishments are so 
disproportionate as to fall within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court has traditionally asked 
whether such punishments offend “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”9  Under this framework, 
the Court has held that capital punishment is a disproportionate penal-
ty for certain groups, such as minors10 and persons with intellectual 
disabilities;11 certain offenses, such as the crime of rape;12 and for de-
fendants whose role in the crime was minor and who did not possess a 
culpable mental state.13 
As a practical matter, proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment has two components: objective indicia of contemporary 
values and application of the Court’s independent judgment.14  Objec-
tive evidence under the first part of the analysis typically consists of 
legislative activity (how many states authorize death for this crime, or 
this category of offender), sentencing juries’ behavior (how often juries 
vote to impose death for this crime, or this category of offender), and 
the actual number of executions conducted for members of a particular 
group (for example, minors) or for a particular offense (for example, 
child rape).15  The Court uses these metrics as a proxy for society’s 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 This is distinct from comparative proportionality review, which the Court held was not con-
stitutionally required in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1984) (concluding that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require appellate courts to compare an individual defendant’s sentence with 
sentences imposed in similar capital cases); rather, “proportionality analysis,” as discussed herein, 
refers to the type of review conducted by the Court in cases like Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v.  
Simmons, Coker v. Georgia, and Kennedy v. Louisiana, described in notes 10–12 below. 
 9 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 10 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the execution of individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time 
of the crime). 
 11 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of individuals with 
intellectual disability constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 12 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (holding that imposition of the death penalty for 
the crime of adult rape is disproportionate and excessive and thus forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the crime of child rape, where death of the victim 
does not result). 
 13 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits the death penalty for a defendant “who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a 
murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a kill-
ing take place or that lethal force will be employed”); cf. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) 
(holding that the death penalty is not disproportionate where the defendant’s participation in fel-
ony resulting in murder is major and the defendant’s mental state is one of reckless indifference). 
 14 See COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 276. 
 15 Id. at 282. 
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underlying views on the matter.16  For example, in Atkins v. Virginia,17 
the Court explained: 
[T]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retard-
ed persons (and the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstat-
ing the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful evidence that 
today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.  The evidence carries even greater 
force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue 
have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.  Moreover, even in 
those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the 
practice is uncommon.18 
Where legislative trends have changed over time, the Court has taken 
into account the speed of such change and the consistency of its direc-
tion.19  The authors of Courting Death argue that other evidence of 
“broader societal and professional consensus,” including the profes-
sional opinion of expert legal organizations like the American Bar  
Association and the American Law Institute, or international norms, 
could also fit comfortably within the “objective evidence” prong of the 
Court’s proportionality doctrine.20  In contrast to the evidence-based 
first prong, the Court’s “own judgment” often involves consideration 
of whether the imposition of a death sentence will further the 
penological goals of retribution and deterrence.21  Under this second 
part of the proportionality framework, the Court has also considered 
or could consider, as the authors point out, factors such as arbitrari-
ness, discrimination, and the risk of wrongful conviction.22 
To the extent proportionality analysis aims to ferret out public sen-
timent,23 there is a question whether the metrics used by the Court 
would provide an accurate proxy for the public’s views on the death 
penalty’s general appropriateness.  As social scientists have demon-
strated, single-question measures of public opinion — one could con-
ceive of state referenda similarly, given their positioning vis-à-vis the 
broader public — do not always accurately capture the complexity of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable objec-
tive evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”). 
 17 536 U.S. 304. 
 18 Id. at 315–16. 
 19 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 282. 
 20 Id. at 282–83. 
 21 Id. at 276 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). 
 22 Id. at 284. 
 23 See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (relying on trends in state legislation as “objective evidence 
of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an 
adult woman”); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 & n.21 (relying on evidence of opinion polls, in 
conjunction with legislative evidence, to demonstrate that a “national consensus,” id. at 316, has 
developed against execution of people with intellectual disability). 
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attitudes regarding the death penalty.24  Moreover, people may answer 
questions about their views on the death penalty differently depending 
on whether they are asked as a juror or as a voter.25  There is some ev-
idence that removing the question from the abstract and placing it in a 
specific context may affect the way individuals respond.  For example, 
one study has shown that people are less likely to be punitive when 
faced with the details of a specific case than when asked about a cer-
tain type of crime in the abstract.26  This research may help to recon-
cile voters’ unwillingness to let go of the death penalty as an abstract 
matter27 with juries’ decreased willingness to impose the death penalty 
in individual cases.28  Such apparent contradiction might also be ac-
counted for by individuals who, while opposed to the death penalty in 
most cases, may be hesitant to remove it as an option in more extreme 
cases or in specific situations.29 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 See Gregg R. Murray, Raising Considerations: Public Opinion and the Fair Application of 
the Death Penalty, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 753, 753 (2003); Stephen F. Smith, Has the “Machinery of 
Death” Become a Clunker?, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 870 (2015) (“[P]olls seeking respondents’ 
views in the abstract about the death penalty have proven to be more than a little fickle over the 
decades.”). 
 25 See Charles Lane, Opinion, Most Americans Don’t Like the Death Penalty, Right? Wrong., 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/most-americans-dont 
-like-the-death-penalty-right-wrong/2016/10/26/a f d 7 e 6 c 8 - 9 b 9 a - 1 1 e 6 - a 0 e d - a b 0 7 7 4 c 1 e a a 5_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5Y7A-JUXF] (critiquing the methodology of certain poll reports and suggesting 
both that a person’s view on the death penalty depends on whether they are asked “in the ab-
stract, as a juror or as a voter,” and that public opinion is “much more nuanced than media cov-
erage generally reflects”). 
 26 See Murray, supra note 24, at 756. 
 27 See, e.g., Frumin, supra note 2 (describing 2016 referenda in California, Nebraska, and  
Oklahoma). 
  One theory, posited by Justice Marshall in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), is that if 
members of the public were more informed about the death penalty — particularly its dispropor-
tionate application to minorities and the poor, and the fact that innocent people have been execut-
ed — they would no longer support it.  Id. at 363–69 (Marshall, J., concurring) (contending that if 
the American people were informed about the discrimination and risk of error inherent in capital 
punishment, they would “condemn death as a sanction,” id. at 364).  This has come to be known 
as “the Marshall hypothesis.”  See COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 260.  But the results of 
social science studies attempting to test the Marshall hypothesis have been mixed, with some sug-
gesting that additional information may lead to increased opposition to the death penalty, and 
others suggesting that the information has little effect, intensifies respondents’ existing views, or 
results only in short-term changes in belief.  See id.  But see Murray, supra note 24, at 756 (find-
ing that studies “generally support” Marshall’s argument, though not all individuals are as suscep-
tible to influence or are influenced for equally long). 
 28 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 213 (noting decrease in death sentences in recent 
years); see also Bill Rankin, Georgia Executions Rise, While Death Sentences Plummet, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (June 18, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/local/georgia-executions-rise 
-while-death-sentences-plummet/atGjGmB9aNVsRIBnavjSYO/ [https://perma.cc/2GX7-DHNK] 
(noting Georgia juries’ growing reluctance to impose the death penalty, with no jury having done 
so since March 2014). 
 29 See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 6, at 1971–72 (“[A]lthough death sentences have steadily fallen 
over the past decade, the decline does not appear to indicate any broad turning against the death 
penalty . . . .  In fact, general support for the death penalty remains relatively high and is likely to 
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Setting aside the question of what can actually be gleaned about 
contemporary values from opinion polls, jury verdicts, or legislation, 
the authors emphasize recent trends in legislative abolition and legal 
experts’ increasing consensus that the death penalty cannot be admin-
istered in a fair or impartial manner.30  In the authors’ view, one of the 
strengths of proportionality analysis is that it provides a vehicle for 
translating these developments into a constitutional prohibition.  From 
outside the “bubble,”31 however, the authors’ application of propor-
tionality would likely receive harsh criticism.  One point the Court has 
made clear throughout its proportionality opinions is that “national 
consensus” is key to its findings regarding the constitutionality of a 
given practice.32  Given that objective evidence must demonstrate na-
tional consensus, one might argue in this case (as have dissenters in 
other cases33) that any evidence of consensus around the general ap-
propriateness of the death penalty is far from “national.”  As the au-
thors point out, the number of states that have abolished the death 
penalty is not “particularly impressive,” coming in at nineteen.34  Even 
considering the four additional states that have gubernatorial morato-
ria in place, one would have to acknowledge that the nature of the 
moratorium may not suggest anything about individual voters’ views 
of the death penalty (or those of the voting majority).  And, by no fault 
of the authors, given the book’s publication prior to the results of the 
2016 election, the direction of the change is no longer consistent.35  As 
for the decreased number of executions in recent years, that could be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
stay there because of an abiding belief that certain crimes, like those committed by Timothy 
McVeigh, deserve only the death penalty.”). 
 30 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 282–84. 
 31 J.D. Vance, Opinion, Life Outside the Liberal Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:49 AM), 
h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / i n t e r a c t i v e / p r o j e c t s / c p / o p i n i o n / e l e c t i o n - n i g h t - 2 0 1 6 / l i f e - o u t s i d e - t h e - l i b e r a l 
-bubble [https://perma.cc/SP73-Z9Q5] (contrasting the experience of “coastal elites” with those in 
other parts of the country, including Trump voters). 
 32 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2001) (“The practice, therefore, has become truly 
unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it.”); id. at 321 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The question presented by this case is whether a national consensus 
deprives Virginia of the constitutional power to impose the death penalty on capital murder de-
fendants like petitioner . . . .”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The evidence 
of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects paral-
lel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death 
penalty for the mentally retarded.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“That bare number of States 
alone — 18 — should be enough to convince any reasonable person that no ‘national consensus’ 
exists. How is it possible that agreement among 47% of the death penalty jurisdictions amounts to 
‘consensus’?”). 
 34 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 282.  The authors acknowledge early in their discus-
sion that “[a]lmost by definition, proportionality limits apply to the most marginal capital prac-
tices,” id. at 164, perhaps requiring a leap to apply that same analysis here. 
 35 See Frumin, supra note 2 (describing referenda results in California, Nebraska, and  
Oklahoma, all favoring preservation of the states’ capital punishment schemes). 
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attributed to other external factors, including problems with obtaining 
the drugs used in lethal injection and related litigation.36  In states like 
Georgia, where such challenges have been made more difficult by the 
fact that details regarding the sources of drugs and the identities of 
those involved in the execution are state secrets,37 the rate of execu-
tions is higher than ever.38 
Instead of national consensus, the evidence demonstrates that 
trends toward abolition have failed to permeate the “death belt” — 
those states in the deep South (and, as a broader matter, the swath of 
the country bordered by Texas and Oklahoma on the west, and Ne-
braska, Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia on the north) that have typi-
cally embraced the death penalty.39  Many of these states have not only 
maintained the death penalty as a possible punishment, but have also 
actively resisted attempts to curtail its reach.  Consider, for example, 
recent attempts in Alabama40 and Mississippi41 to reintroduce the fir-
ing squad as an available method of execution, in light of increased 
challenges to lethal injection procedures.  Another example is Texas’s 
insistent use of its “special issue” jury instructions to deny capital de-
fendants their right to meaningful consideration of constitutionally rel-
evant mitigating evidence — and the Texas courts’ repeated approval 
of such use — even though the Supreme Court has deemed their appli-
cation unconstitutional on multiple occasions.42 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 36 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 141–43.  Relatedly, Professor Scott Sundby notes that 
the decline in new death sentences “cannot be attributed to any single factor, but is likely the re-
sult of the convergence of a number of influences.”  Sundby, supra note 6, at 1935. 
 37 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-36 (2014) (codifying Georgia’s Lethal Injection Secrecy Act, which 
protects the identity of the people prescribing the drugs used in lethal injections, the identity of 
the companies that produce and supply such drugs, and the identity of prison staff who carry out 
executions). 
 38 See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 1, at 2; Rankin, supra note 28. 
 39 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/29DL-YBFR]. 
 40 Bryan Lyman, Bill Would Bring Firing Squad Executions to Alabama, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER (Nov. 7, 2016, 5:41 PM), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/news/politics 
/southunionstreet/2016/11/07/bill-would-bring-firing-squad-executions-alabama/93427800/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4H2D-74J7]. 
 41 Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi Considers Firing Squad as Method of Execution, ASSO-
CIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:26 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7055b192 
b55c4020803ca61fdf7886e1/mississippi-considers-firing-squad-method-execution [https://perma.cc 
/D3FQ-BGXD]. 
 42 See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 237–38 (2007) (holding Texas’s special issue 
jury instructions did not allow jurors to give “meaningful consideration to constitutionally rele-
vant mitigating evidence”); Smith v. Texas (Smith II), 550 U.S. 297, 300, 316 (2007) (correcting 
Texas state court’s misunderstanding of earlier case law regarding Texas special issue jury instruc-
tion and its subsequent failures to apply harmless-error standard and grant relief); Smith v. Texas 
(Smith I), 543 U.S. 37, 38 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that supplemental “nullification instruction” 
given to jury failed to correct unconstitutional deficiency in Texas special issue jury instructions); 
Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 797–800 (2001) (correcting Texas court’s interpretation 
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Although the Court’s regulation of the death penalty has limited its 
imposition, it has also left many openings for active death penalty 
states to ensure its continued application.  In other words, states desir-
ing to push forward with the death penalty can often find a way to do 
so.  Death penalty jurisprudence is replete with such examples includ-
ing, most prominently, many states’ hasty enactment or re-enactment 
of their capital punishment schemes in the wake of Furman.43  On a 
more granular level, consider the practical impact of Georgia’s re-
quirement that capital defendants seeking exemption from the death 
penalty prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt.44  
While this standard does not directly contravene the Court’s holding in 
Atkins — to the contrary, it exploits an explicit loophole45 — in prac-
tice it has made it nearly impossible for capital defendants to prove in-
tellectual disability.46 
Moreover, many states are not as ready as the Court (or at least 
some of its members) to accept the views of expert legal organizations.  
One example of this is apparent in Alabama state courts’ understand-
ing of “prevailing professional norms” in assessing claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.47  In a study I 
conducted several years ago of the Alabama courts’ interpretation of 
this standard, in only twelve of eighty-six cases citing such language 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
of Penry I and holding that supplemental instruction failed to cure the unconstitutionality of the 
Texas special issue jury instructions); Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (hold-
ing that Texas special issue jury instructions were applied to unconstitutionally deprive the jury of 
a vehicle to fully consider evidence of petitioner’s intellectual disability). 
 43 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
 44 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2013) (“The defendant may be found ‘guilty but mentally 
retarded’ if the jury, or court acting as trier of facts, finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty of the crime charged and is mentally retarded.”); see also COURTING DEATH, 
supra note 7, at 228. 
 45 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (“As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright 
with regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to en-
force the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’” (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986))). 
 46 See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, An Empirical Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt Standard to Determine Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 47 466 U.S. 688 (1984).  See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Lawyering to the Lowest Common Denomi-
nator: Strickland’s Potential for Incorporating Underfunded Norms into Legal Doctrine, 5 
FAULKNER L. REV. 199 (2014) (solicited as part of the Fred Gray Civil Rights Symposium) (re-
vealing that Alabama state courts assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland have been reluctant to afford external sources, such as the ABA Guidelines, any signif-
icant weight); see also Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009) (per curiam) (emphasizing that the 
ABA Guidelines are “‘only guides’ to what reasonableness means, not its definition” (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688)); id. at 13–14 (Alito, J., concurring) (contesting the notion that the 
Guidelines “have special relevance in determining whether an attorney’s performance meets the 
standard required by the Sixth Amendment”). 
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from Strickland did the court cite to the ABA Guidelines.48  “In only 
four of these cases . . . did the court rely on the Guidelines as a 
benchmark for reasonable performance.  In the other eight cases, the 
court cited the Guidelines only to reject their applicability, echoing 
Strickland’s caveat that such sources are merely guides.”49  Instead, 
Alabama courts were much more likely to rely on precedent, their own 
judgment, or local practice norms.50  While this is only one example 
and does not bear directly on the question at hand, it certainly suggests 
that some courts would not agree that the ABA’s views should over-
shadow their own judgment.  Similarly, they may be less likely to find 
international norms persuasive. 
But, the argument goes, states like Alabama and Georgia are 
anomalies.  Current empirical evidence demonstrates that actual use of 
the death penalty has become a localized phenomenon, concentrated in 
a few states and arguably even a handful of counties.51  Thus, it is a 
prime candidate for constitutional extinction.  There have certainly 
been other areas of Court-driven constitutional change in which prior 
to a holding of unconstitutionality, the South had become an outlier, or 
was more extreme in its treatment of the issue — for example, same-
sex marriage and racial segregation.  And in those cases, objectors 
were quick to accuse the Court of imposing its own policy judgment 
on the states, as they surely would if the Court were to declare the 
death penalty unconstitutional as a matter of proportionality.  The 
Court is in many ways a countermajoritarian institution,52 and schol-
ars have long struggled with how to reconcile its institutional nature 
with our democratic structure.53  This problem is exacerbated, howev-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 Lucas, supra note 47, at 210. 
 49 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 50 Id. at 203, 215–16. 
 51 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 283; James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority 
Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 263 (noting 
that “county-level analysis reveals . . . the modern American death penalty is a distinctly minority 
practice across the United States”); see also FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, TOO BROKEN TO 
FIX: PART I, AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT AMERICA’S OUTLIER DEATH PENALTY COUNTIES 2 
(2016), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FPP-TooBroken.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/Q3XJ-T72F] (“[O]nly 16 counties imposed five or more death sentences between 2010 and 
2015.”); Liebman & Clarke, supra, at 262–63. 
 52 Personally, I believe there are good reasons for the Court to serve this role, such as to ensure 
access to the political process.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980) (explaining that the Court’s proper role is process-
oriented). 
 53 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force in our system.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Con-
stitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 495 (1994) (noting that “the 
last generation of constitutional scholars” has been “[p]reoccupied with the ‘countermajoritarian 
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er, when the Court bases its analytical framework on its own assess-
ment of the public’s values and then translates that assessment into a 
constitutional prohibition on the states.  In contexts like same-sex mar-
riage and school desegregation, the Court relied on its understanding 
of what equal protection and due process require to invalidate the laws 
at issue; while trends in popular sentiment may have been atmospheri-
cally relevant, they did not provide a basis for the Court’s holding.54  
Proportionality, in contrast, relies directly on a determination of con-
temporary values, or “evolving standards of decency.”  While both 
frameworks inevitably involve some amount of subjective judgment, 
only proportionality purports to rely on an objective assessment of 
whether the American people perceive something as acceptable.  In the 
proportionality context, therefore, it may be difficult for the Court to 
maintain a veneer of impartiality in the face of a weak evidentiary 
case. 
In writing this, I do not intend to defend the death penalty as it is 
currently administered.  But it may be worth devoting more time to 
considering the relative legitimacy of the various avenues proposed for 
judicial abolition.  The authors of Courting Death argue that propor-
tionality analysis is best suited for the task, in contrast to an approach 
based solely on arbitrariness or discrimination, in part because argu-
ments based on the latter would depend heavily on empirical evi-
dence.55  The authors explain that producing empirical evidence is 
both expensive and time-consuming, and that such evidence is often 
limited in terms of temporal and geographic scope.56  Yet the authors 
may also underestimate proportionality’s flaws, including its own reli-
ance on informal, and perhaps imprecise, empirical analysis of statutes, 
executions, and the direction and consistency of change.57  There is al-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
difficulty’”); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The 
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998). 
 54 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 962 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The rule of Brown [v. Board of Edu-
cation] is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment that the 
Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation . . . .”). 
 55 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 274; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–
77 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on numerous empirical studies to provide a basis for find-
ing the death penalty unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment). 
 56 COURTING DEATH, supra note 7, at 274. 
 57 The counting conducted in these cases is often challenged and subject to interpretation, as 
demonstrated by the jousting between the majority and dissenting opinions in cases like Atkins v. 
Virginia, Roper v. Simmons, and Kennedy v. Louisiana.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 460–61 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In light of the points discussed above, I believe that the 
‘objective indicia’ of our society’s ‘evolving standards of decency’ can be fairly summarized as 
follows.  Neither Congress nor juries have done anything that can plausibly be interpreted as evi-
dencing the ‘national consensus’ that the Court perceives.  State legislatures, for more than 30 
years, have operated under the ominous shadow of the Coker dicta and thus have not been free to 
express their own understanding of our society’s standards of decency.  And in the months follow-
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so the question of institutional legitimacy, and whether the Court has 
any advantage over the legislative branch in determining what the 
public feels is an appropriate punishment.  While both require some 
level of interpretation, approaches relying on fundamental fairness ar-
guably fall more comfortably within the judicial role than those that 
compel the Court to constitutionalize its perception of dominant trends 
in the application of the death penalty.  Thus, arguments based on 
fairness and the elimination of arbitrariness may warrant more thor-
ough consideration. 
Ultimately, the question of whether someone’s life should be taken 
as punishment for a crime is a deeply personal and moral decision.  
But the question of whether the death penalty is administered fairly 
and impartially is one squarely within the Court’s domain.  The diffi-
culty with proportionality analysis is that it falls somewhere in the 
gray area between those two realms — particularly as applied to the 
death penalty’s very existence.  It channels the Court’s legal under-
standing of what it means to be cruel and unusual while simultaneous-
ly asking whether most people would conclude that someone truly de-
serves to die as punishment for the acts they have committed.  Some 
may view proportionality analysis as an effective tool to force states 
that are out of step or too stubborn to recognize what is right, to align 
with the will of a bare and righteous majority.  But when the will of 
that majority is not clearly discernable, and a significant number of 
voters and states continue to express support for the death penalty, a 
decision based explicitly on an assessment of contemporary values may 
place a strain on the Court’s institutional legitimacy. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ing our grant of certiorari in this case, state legislatures have had an additional reason to pause.  
Yet despite the inhibiting legal atmosphere that has prevailed since 1977, six States have recently 
enacted new, targeted child-rape laws.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 611 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s choice to include in its count those states that had abolished 
the death penalty, arguing “[t]hat 12 States favor no executions says something about consensus 
against the death penalty, but nothing — absolutely nothing — about consensus that offenders 
under 18 deserve special immunity from such a penalty.”); id. at 614 (“It is, furthermore, unclear 
that executions of the relevant age group have decreased since we decided Stanford [v. Ken-
tucky].”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court’s 
uncritical acceptance of the opinion poll data brought to our attention, moreover, warrants addi-
tional comment, because we lack sufficient information to conclude that the surveys were con-
ducted in accordance with generally accepted scientific principles or are capable of supporting 
valid empirical inferences about the issue before us.”). 
